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This report provides an overview of the activities carried on in 2016 in the JRC.E in the context of GNSS for road
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Abstract
The application of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) services in the road trans-
portation sector has substantially increased in recent years. Position Velocity and Time
(PVT) information is playing and will play even more in the future a crucial role in all aspects
of Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) technologies. There are many ITS applications
which benefit from the use of GNSS services like active safety, advanced driver assistance,
road tolling, digital tachograph, fleet management. In the near future, autonomous driving
and Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS) will strongly depend on the position
and localization technologies.
In comparison to other domains where GNSS is used, road transportation applications
often include safety or regulatory aspects where the accuracy and reliability of position in-
formation need to be known a priori to assure active safety. For example, the new version
of the digital tachograph defined in regulation EC 165/2014 requires the use of GNSS to
record the start and end location of the activity of a driver of a commercial vehicle. In ad-
dition, the user location must be recorded every three hours of accumulated driving time.
There are significant economical gains for malicious parties to falsify the data calculated
from GNSS. The unavailability of GNSS services can also have a significant negative impact
in the above mentioned regulated applications. While current safety related applications
in the road transportation sectors are loosely dependent on satellite data due to the un-
certainty of positioning errors, to data/signal delays and quality-of-service issues, future
applications are expected to better exploit the potential offered by modern and future GNSS
signals and services. For example, autonomous driving could benefit from GNSS services if
they will be able to provide accurate and precise location data in a timely manner. As a con-
sequence, it is important to mitigate threats (both intentional or unintentional) which could
negatively impact the provision of GNSS services and to investigate complementary means
which could be used to make more robust and accurate the calculation of PVT information
in the road transportation sector.
In addition to Radio Frequency (RF) threats, the provision of PVT information from a
GNSS receiver can be impaired through the manipulation of the data output by the receiver
itself. In a vehicle, the GNSS receiver may be integrated in a network where PVT information
is used by several devices. A malicious entity may falsify the information provided by the
GNSS receiver in the internal in-vehicle network compromising the operations of the devices
connected. In this context, the authentication of the source of information (e.g., the GNSS
receiver) to the on board platform is also important.
The goal of this report is to provide an overview of the activities carried on in 2016 in
the unit E.2 and E.3 in the context described above. In particular, the following activities
were carried out:
1. Experimental campaigns of jamming of GNSS signals in a road transportation context.
2. Analysis and experimental evaluation of authentication of a GNSS receiver using the
physical properties of the GNSS receiver itself.
3. Experimental evaluation of augmented GNSS using Inertial Mounted Unit (IMU) sys-
tems with Extended Kalmann Filterings (EKFs) and Particle Filterings (PFs).
4. Preliminary evaluation of the authentication of the Galileo OS.
In some cases, the analysis was performed and published in the form of a scientific
paper submitted to a journal or a conference. While this report provides a summary of the
results from the scientific papers, the details of the analysis are in the papers themselves.
The papers are provided as annexes.
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1. Introduction
The application of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) to the road transportation
sector has steadily increased in recent years. In fact, the road transportation sector has
been one of the early adopter of GNSS technology to track vehicles, support the user driving
and facilitate the delivery of goods and persons.
There are many applications, which benefited from the application of GNSS:
1. Fleet Management: where the location of the fleet vehicles at any given time is very
important for the fleet manager to monitor the status of the delivery and to improve
the route selection.
2. Driving support: where the location of the vehicle can support the driver to identify
more efficiently the best route to reach the destination.
3. Traffic management: where road authorities can use the vehicle locations to assess
the traffic conditions and improve the road management.
4. Tolling: where the information needed to calculate tolling can be based on the position
recorded and transmitted by GNSS receivers installed in the vehicle rather than using
Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) systems
5. Specific regulated applications: where the Position Velocity and Time (PVT) information
provided by the GNSS receiver is used to satisfy policy needs. Examples are the eCall
and the digital tachograph.
6. Pay as you drive insurance schemes: where the insurance fee is based on the driving
activity rather than on a flat yearly fee.
This list is only a subset of a wider list of Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) appli-
cations, which benefited from the application of GNSS and which are already quite familiar
to the general user. Future applications can also benefit from GNSS. For example, au-
tonomous vehicles could use the PVT provided by GNSS to improve the cognitive driving
process. Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS) could use the same PVT in-
formation, which exchanged among the vehicles and the roadside systems (called C-ITS
stations) to improve vehicle coordination, safety and traffic efficiency.
To support current and future applications, the PVT information should be reliable, pre-
cise and accurate. More specifically, the following high level requirements should be satis-
fied:
1. Availability: GNSS signals and services should be available to the vehicle at any time.
This may not be always possible, because physical obstacles (e.g., buildings in an
urban environment) or wireless interference either intentional (e.g., jamming) or un-
intentional which could degrade or block the GNSS signals before they reach the GNSS
receiver.
2. Reliability: the provided information (i.e., PVT) should be reliable. In other words, it
should be resistant against attacks, which could change the content transmitted by
the GNSS signal. An example is the spoofing attack, which changes the content of the
GNSS data.
3. Accuracy: the PVT provided by the GNSS receiver should be accurate. There is an
extensive bibliography on the analysis of the factors, which contribute to the accuracy
of the PVT solution. These factors may include physical obstacles (as for availability)
or other conditions. Accuracy could be improved if the GNSS data are complemented
by other sources such as accelerometers and gyroscopes which could be installed in
the vehicle.
4. Timeliness: the provided information should be processed in time so that the user
applications can exploit it. For example, in the C-ITS context, the safety messages
are transmitted and received quite frequently (e.g., many times in a second). Because
a safety message contains PVT information, the GNSS signals should be processed by
the telematics systems in the vehicle in short time.
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In this report, we will focus on the requirements 1), 2) and 3) as timeliness is often
a performance aspect addressed by the producer of the GNSS receiver. In particular, we
investigated:
1. what is the impact of an intentional attack on GNSS signals through jamming in a road
transportation context to address requirement 1).
2. how the accuracy of the position provided by a GNSS receiver can be improved exploit-
ing the information provided by additional accelerometers and gyroscopes installed in
the vehicle. This is to address requirement 3).
3. if new authentication mechanisms could be used. In particular, we investigated the
authentication of the open service of Galileo to address requirement 2).
Another aspect is related to the distribution of GNSS information. When the GNSS
receiver is external to the processing platform, i.e. the On Board Unit (OBU) of the vehicle,
it is important to protect the data provided by the GNSS receiver. A view of the possible
architecture where the GNSS receiver is external to the OBU is shown in Figure 1. This
architecture has been considered for applications such as the digital tachograph.
Figure 1: Architecture where the GNSS receiver is external to the OBU. In this case, the connection
used to provide GNSS data should be secured.
GNSS Antenna
GNSS Receiver
On board Unit 
platform
The link between the GNSS receiver and the OBU must be protected. This can be
achieved through cryptographic means, but the distribution of cryptographic keys could
be complex to implement or the keys could be compromised. Even with this potential
shortcomings, this is the used approach to secure the link between the motion sensor and
the vehicle unit of the digital tachograph and it is also the one implemented for standard
ISO 16844.
In our research work, we have also investigated the possibility to authenticate the sen-
sor through the physical properties of the GNSS receiver itself and the way it processes the
GNSS data. In this way, the authentication can be based on the intrinsic physical features
of the GNSS receiver.
The report provides the results and the investigation carried on in the areas described
previously on the basis of the following structure:
• Section 2 describes the analysis on the impact of GNSS jamming. The analysis is
extracted from published papers presented at conferences at journals by the authors
of this report.
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• Section 3 describes the algorithms and the results of the experimental campaigns to
improve GNSS accuracy using Inertial Mounted Unit (IMU) integration.
• Section 5 describes the potential use of GNSS fingerprinting to support multi-factor
authentication of the GNSS receiver. The analysis is extracted from published papers
presented at conferences by the authors of this report.
• Section 4 describes the activities carried on in 2016 by the DG JRC E.2 and E.3 units
in the context of the Galileo Open Service (OS) authentication.
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2. GNSS Jamming
GNSS jamming consists in the emission of a powerful electromagnetic wave towards a vic-
tim GNSS receiver with the ultimate goal of preventing the computation of the user PVT.
Jamming can be perpetrated using low-cost portable devices called jammers. The prolif-
eration of such devices is expected to grow along with the development of GNSS-based
services.
In the road transportation sector, a malicious entity can have a commercial interest to
implement jamming to deny the collection of PVT data from the GNSS receiver. For ex-
ample, electronic tolling based on GNSS or the new version of the digital tachograph (i.e.,
smart tachograph based on European regulation 165/2014) are dependent on GNSS. A dis-
honest user can obtain an unfair advantage because the tolling manager or the law enforcer
would not be able to get the needed specific positions of the vehicle to ensure conformance
to regulations.
There is an extensive literature on the implementation of GNSS jamming attacks and on
possible countermeasure. A recent special issue of the IEEE Proceedings (June 2016, Vol.
104, Issue 5) investigated different GNSS threats and mitigation approaches. In particular,
possible solutions to address GNSS jamming include
1. jamming detection (Borio et al., 2016)
2. mitigation of the jamming effects (Gao et al., 2016)
3. localization of the jamming source (Dempster and Cetin, 2016).
Although the first two solutions have been extensively investigated, jammer localiza-
tion has recently received significant attention from the scientific community and research
groups have devoted their efforts to the design of localization techniques. The fast and
accurate identification of the location of the jammer source is a very effective way to stop
jamming. In fact, jamming localization could become a powerful tool used by law enforcers
to identify in the road infrastructures the presence of a non-compliance related to the use of
GNSS. For example, a jammer localization system used by a law enforcer could identify the
presence of a GNSS jammer on a commercial vehicle, which is used to deny the collection
of position information for the smart tachograph. Beyond road transportation, the usage
of GNSS jammers is considered illegal in most countries because it could interfere with
needed services in other domains (e.g., synchronization of the smart grids or telecommu-
nication infrastructures) and the availability of reliable localization techniques will simplify
the operations of authorities trying to stop this phenomenon.
To investigate the technical feasibility to identify GNSS jammers, some of the authors of
this report have conducted experimental campaigns in a realistic road environment.
The experimental campaigns were performed in Slovenia and they were authorized by
the Agency for Communication Networks and Services of the Republic of Slovenia (AKOS).
The experimental activities were conducted in collaboration with the University of Ljubljana
and its branch in Portoroº, Slovenia. The experiments were conceived to evaluate the size
of the area affected by a GNSS jammer installed on a vehicle driving at different speeds on
the road. Different detection approaches were considered by using both GNSS receivers
(even included in consumer grade smartphones) and low cost Software Defined Radio (SDR)
platforms, with the objective to reveal the presence of the GNSS jammer and identify its
location. Two experimental campaigns were conducted: the first in July 2015 and the
second in November 2015.
A detailed description of the experimental settings and the results obtained in the ex-
perimental campaigns are provided in the following two papers:
• the paper presented at the ION GNSS+ 2016 conference in Portland Oregon 'Jammer
Localization: from Crowdsourcing to Synthetic Detection' registered in the JRC PUBSY
systems with identifier JRC100806.
• the paper published in the magazine Coordinates 'Trapping the Jammer: the Slovenian
Experiment' registered in the JRC PUBSY systems with identifier JRC103329.
Both papers are available in the JRC PUBSY system and they are also reproduced in
Annex 1 of this report. Both papers demonstrate the possibility of detecting and localizing
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jammers using low-cost Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components and C/N0 measure-
ments provided by commercial GPS receivers and by smartphones.
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3. Augmented GNSS with IMU
In this section, we describe the work done to improve the accuracy of the the position
calculated using GNSS on the basis of the fusion with IMU data. GNSS is not the only
available positioning technology. Wireless Communication technologies based on ranging
can also provide accurate position depending on the environment and the features of the
wireless communication technology (e.g., bandwidth, power). Another class of positioning
systems is based on IMU, i.e the combination of accelerometers and gyroscopes.
In 2014 and 2015, the JRC has conducted a project on the use of IMU to improve accu-
racy of the GNSS reported position in the context of road transportation. The idea was to
combine GPS measurements with additional information coming from various vehicle sen-
sors and, in particular, from an IMU installed in a vehicle. Unluckily, solving the data fusion
problem may entail a formidable complexity mainly due to a) the intrinsic nonlinearity of
the involved measurement and state models, and b) the large dimensionality of the system
state. A theoretical model was implemented by Prof. Vitetta from Consorzio Nazionale
Interuniversitario per le Telecomunicazioni (CNIT) to address these issues and it was pub-
lished as report JRC93775. In the report, the problem of navigation is analysed from a
theoretical viewpoint and it is shown that methods for mixed linear/nonlinear systems, like
Particle Filtering (PF) and Extended Kalmann Filtering (EKF), can be exploited to solve this
problem at an acceptable complexity. The problem of embedding map information in the fil-
tering process was also analysed. The theoretical model was then implemented in MATLAB
and tested with real data collected in measurement campaigns where the GNSS receiver
and the IMU were installed on a vehicle.
A microcomputer connected to a DAISY 7 board with an IMU and a GNSS receiver was
installed in a vehicle and it was used to collect data in a specific route in the JRC campus.
The setup and the car used in the experiment are shown respectively in Figures 2 and 3.
Figure 2: View of the experimental platform used to collect GNSS and IMU data.
The path selected for the experiment is shown in Figure 4.
The three approaches used to estimate the user location are compared in Figure 5. The
three approaches considered are GPS alone and EKF and PF with IMU data fusion. From
the figure, we note that the combination of GPS with PF provides a better accuracy than
with the other sensors (GPS and IMU).
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Figure 3: The car used in the GNSS/IMU experiment.
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Figure 4: Path selected for the experimental campaign involving GNSS and IMU data.
9
Figure 5: Trajectories estimated using the GPS only solution and the PF. Map information has been
added to the data fusion process.
8.628 8.63 8.632 8.634 8.636 8.638 8.64
45.805
45.806
45.807
45.808
45.809
45.81
45.811
45.812
Lon [deg]
L
a
t  
[ d
e
g
]
10
4. Galileo OS Authentication
As described in the introduction, there is the need to mitigate various threats to the provi-
sion of PVT through GNSS in road transportation. In particular spoofing attacks where the
PVT data can be modified. If implemented successfully, a spoofing attack can be a more
serious threat than jamming because a false information can directly create a safety hazard
(as in the case of C-ITSs) or indirectly by tampering with correct operations of regulated
application like the digital tachograph.
Several techniques have been proposed to mitigate GNSS vulnerabilities like spoofing.
Adding cryptographic features to GNSS signals is one of them. This is the case of the
Commercial Service (CS) of Galileo, which is not free.
Another possibility has been proposed recently in (Fernández-Hernández et al., 2016),
where it is described the authentication of the Galileo OS, the Navigation Message Authen-
tication (NMA) used to protect the Galileo navigation message. NMA can make the Galileo
OS more resilient against spoofing attacks, and therefore protect Galileo signals against
certain threats.
The proposed Galileo authenticated services may provide major benefits to users at a
very low additional cost to the programme. It is planned that Galileo will start to transmit
the OS NMA as of 2018, and it will be included in the full operational capability in 2020.
The OS NMA is very useful for the new smart tachograph where it is specifically requested
by regulation 165/2014 that the used GNSS service is free of charge, which forbids the use
of the commercial service of Galileo.
DG.JRC.E.2 and DG.JRC.E.3 worked together with DG GROW and European GNSS Agency
(GSA) on the OS NMA. E.2 supported the definition of OS NMA, while E.3 has worked on
the application of OS NMA to the digital tachograph.
In August 2016, representatives from E.2 and E.3 have met Ignacio Fernandez Hernan-
dez from DG GROW to discuss how to support DG GROW for the assessment of OS NMA in
prevision of its future deployment.
As Dr Fernandez Hernandez explained in a series of slides at the GNSS summer school
organized in Ispra in August 2016, the OS NMA will be based on TESLA which is briefly
summarized in Figure 6. The main service drivers for the definition of OS NMA are:
• Open access: it requires the uses of asymmetric cryptography.
• One-to-many: satellites provide a one way communication channel.
• Noise tolerance: the GNSS channel is noisy and has a low bandwidth.
• Commensurate receiver requirements: CPU, memory, connectivity, protection.
• Long-term security: OS NMA should provide long-term cryptographic security.
• Backward compatibility: the introduction of OS NMA should not affect users not inter-
ested.
While OS NMA is a very important key differentiator for Galileo in comparison to other
GNSSs (i.e. GPS, Glonass, Baidu), it does not guarantee security against all types of
attacks. This is predictable because CS and Public Regulated Service (PRS) are designed
for higher level of security. Still, it is quite important to support DG GROW and evaluate
against which types of attacks OS NMA can be used. This will be the main objective of the
collaboration between E.2, E.3 and DG GROW in 2017.
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Figure 6: Schematic representation of the OS NMA scheme based on TESLA protocol. From the
presentation of Dr. Fernandez Hernandez, Ispa, Italy, July 2016.
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5. GNSS Receiver Fingerprinting for White List Authentication
As described in Sections 2 and 4, the processing of GNSS signals by a GNSS receiver can be
negatively impacted by jamming and spoofing attacks and potential countermeasures (e.g.,
detection and location of the jammer) have been presented. In this section, we describe
another potential threat to the use of GNSS in the road transportation sector, i.e. GNSS
data faking.
Even if the GNSS receiver is able to mitigate jamming and spoofing, the processed
PVT information must still be provided to other platforms and to components present in
the commercial vehicle. As shown in Figure 1, a road transportation application like fleet
management could require the installation of an OBU in a vehicle, which must be connected
to an external GNSS receiver. Even if an OBU could be installed with an internal GNSS
receiver, it could be more practical to have one external GNSS receiver which could serve
different applications present in the vehicle platform (there could also be different OBUs).
The connection between the GNSS receiver and the OBU could be paired or coupled through
cryptographic means, where the OBU and the GNSS receiver mutually authenticate each
other. While this solution is technically feasible and there are many low cost cryptographic
components, which could be used for this purpose, it may be organizationally complex
because the OBU and the GNSS receiver should be equipped with symmetric or asymmetric
keys. These keys should be installed in the initial deployment of the commercial vehicle or
during the installation of equipment required by specific application. The keys should be
protected from external attacks. One possible way would be to make the GNSS receiver
and the OBU tamper-proof. In addition, the cryptographic material should be updated when
the underlying cryptographic algorithm is not considered secure any longer or in case of its
public disclosure.
We investigated another potential solution, which could be used to support the authen-
tication of the GNSS receiver by the OBU. This solution is based on the exploitation of
the unique physical or software features of the GNSS receiver. These characteristics are
difficult to be cloned or modified because they are part of the device itself. There is an
extensive research literature on the exploitation of the physical properties of an electronic
device to authenticate it. In most cases, this can be achieved because each electronic com-
ponent has tiny differences generated in the manufacturing process or due to the materials
which composes it. This produces a unique fingerprint which plays a role similar to that
of DNA in human beings. Similarly to the DNA, a fingerprint can unequivocally identify a
device. Fingerprints can be determined using the digital output generated or emitted by the
electronic device. For example, there is an extensive literature on the exploitation of the
Radio Frequency (RF) emissions of consumer mass market mobile phones, which can be
used to uniquely identify the phone itself with high accuracy (Hasse et al., 2013). In other
cases a phone can be identified by its digital camera (Li, 2010) or by the digital output of
its accelerometers (Baldini et al., 2016). To the knowledge of the authors of this report,
there is no research record on the possibility to fingerprint a mobile phone by using its
internal GNSS receiver. The identification of the GNSS receiver through its digital output
could be used to pair it to the OBU or the OBUs in the commercial vehicle. In a potential
deployment scenario, OBU could record the specific fingerprint of the paired GNSS receiver
in the installation phase of the application and the OBU. If the GNSS receiver is replaced
by another device by a malicious entity the OBU could compare the different fingerprints
and understand that the device has been replaced. In other words, the fingerprint is used
to authenticate the legitimate GNSS receiver and mitigate the risk of its replacement with
another device, which could provide false data. Note that the fake GNSS receiver will have
difficulties to provide data leading to a fingerprint similar to that of the original device.
The fingerprint can be based and represented with many different statistical features which
have to be intrinsically robust to forgery. The selection of appropriate features is a key
aspect which makes data forgery difficult.
To investigate this approach, some of the authors of this report have performed experi-
mental campaigns with a significant number of GNSS receivers in different conditions and
they have collected the data generated by the GNSS receivers. The test setup adopted for
this purpose is schematically shown in Figure 7.
The analysis performed on the data collected from GNSS receivers, the identification
of fingerprints on the basis of the selected features and the classification results were
presented at the ION GNSS+ conference in September 2016 at Portland, Oregon, USA. The
conference paper is presented in Annex 3.
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Figure 7: Different types of GNSS receivers used for fingerprinting.
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Statistical features were derived from the raw data of the GNSS receiver. This output
includes pseudoranges and Doppler measurements. Some of the basic features considered
in the paper are briefly illustrated in Figure 8. The features selected are based on the
behavior of the GNSS receiver under test. GNSS receivers naturally provide the bias of
their local clock with respect to a stable GNSS time scale. The clock bias characterizes the
GNSS receiver and clock-related features can be derived considering parameters such as
the Allan Deviation (ADEV) and the correlation between the samples of the clock bias time
series. These parameters are illustrated in Figure 8. The statistical features are evaluated
at period of time in order to assess their variability. The stability of the features is an
important requirements for the definition of a fingerprint which should be stable over time.
As described in detail in the Annex, the best statistical features were selected based on their
capacity to distinguish the different GNSS receivers. The best set of statistical features was
used to generate the fingerprints for the GNSS receivers. As seen from Figure 9, which
provides the final results, it is possible to distinguish the GNSS receivers of different models
but it is not possible to distinguish in a effective way GNSS receivers of the same model.
This may be a limitation for the application of this approach for authentication because
different GNSS receivers are not distinguishable. On the other side, a malicious device,
which replaces a valid GNSS receiver, may have a very different hardware structure (it may
not even be a GNSS receiver) and it could be considered a different model, so this approach
could be valid in this context.
Short-term clock-derived features are the most effective with features derived from
Doppler measurements more stable to environmental changes. From Figure 9, the pos-
sibility of distinguishing professional and mass-market receivers clearly emerges. Future
work will use a wider set of statistical features and a larger number of GNSS receivers.
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Figure 8: Clock-derived metrics used for the selection of statistical features used for fingerprinting. Clock Derived Metrics 
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Figure 9: Sample classification results for different GNSS receivers.
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6. Conclusions
In this report, we have described the main activities of DG JRC.E.2 and DG JRC.E.3 in the
area of the application of GNSS to road transportation. In particular, we investigated the
possible threats to GNSS like jamming and spoofing. The work will continue in 2017 with
specific focus on Galileo OS NMA and research in improving the accuracy of GNSS using
data fusion with IMU systems installed in a vehicle.
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7. Annex 1 - Jammer Localization: from Crowdsourcing to
Synthetic Detection
The paper Jammer Localization: from Crowdsourcing to Synthetic Detection is available at
http://www.ion.org/publications/abstract.cfm?jp=p&articleID=14689
The paper should be cited as:
Borio, Daniele, Gioia, Ciro, tern, Andrej, Dimc, Franc, Baldini, Gianmarco, Jammer Local-
ization: From Crowdsourcing to Synthetic Detection, Proceedings of the 29th International
Technical Meeting of The Satellite Division of the Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2016),
Portland, Oregon, September 2016, pp. 3107-3116.
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8. Annex 2 - Trapping the Jammer: the Slovenian Experiment
A copy of the article  Trapping the Jammer: the Slovenian Experiment is provided in this
annex. The paper has been published in the magazine Coordinates (https://mycoordinates.org/).
The paper has been published in the October 2016 issue of the magazine and it can be re-
trieved at the following url:
http://mycoordinates.org/pdf/oct16.pdf
The paper deserved the journal cover which is reported in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Cover of the October 2016 issue of Coordinates. The cover is devoted to the concept
of trapping a GNSS jammer.
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Trapping the jammer: the 
Slovenian experiment
This paper provides a comprehensive account of the activities jointly conducted by the European 
Commission Joint Research Centre, the University of Ljubljana and Agency for Communication 
and Services of Republic of Slovenia to characterize and ultimately mitigate the jamming threat
x GNSS
During the last decade, the number of applications relying on Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) 
has experienced an exponential growth. 
Nowadays, GNSS positioning is 
fundamental in different fi elds including 
avionics, Location Based Services 
(LBSs), road and maritime transportation. 
Moreover, GNSS technologies are 
key-enabler for several regulated and 
safety-critical applications, such as the 
Digital Tachograph (DT), the Automatic 
Identifi cation System?(AIS) and time 
distribution infrastructures. Hence, GNSS 
should provide reliable and continuous 
services. These services, however, can be 
easily disrupted by several interference 
sources including intentional attacks such 
as spoofi ng and jamming. Jamming, in 
particular, is the voluntary emission of 
powerful electromagnetic waves towards 
a victim GNSS receiver which will be 
prevented to operate [1]. Jamming can 
be perpetrated using low-cost portable 
devices called jammers. The proliferation 
of such devices is expected to grow along 
with the development of GNSS-based 
services. Possible solutions to address 
GNSS jamming include jamming detection 
[2] and jammer localization [3]. This paper 
presents the joint efforts of the European 
Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC), 
of the University of Ljubljana and of the 
Agency for Communication and Services 
of Republic of Slovenia (AKOS) towards 
the development of reliable and affordable 
techniques for jamming detection and 
localization. The activities performed 
have a strong experimental component 
and two extensive data collections were 
carried out with the ultimate goal to design 
effective jamming countermeasures. The 
principle is similar to that adopted to 
fi ne drivers not respecting speed limits: 
a speed trap is used to identify and fi ne 
the law transgressor. In a similar way, 
“jammer traps” should be developed to 
allow authorities to reliably identify the 
presence of jammers on-board vehicles 
and fi ne the jammer user. It is noted 
that the usage of GNSS jammers is 
considered illegal in most countries and 
the availability of reliable localization 
techniques will simplify the operations of 
authorities trying to stop this phenomenon.
The fi rst data collection was organized 
in July 2015 and it was followed by 
a second campaign that took place in 
November 2015. The second campaign 
benefi ted from the experience gained 
during the experiments conducted in 
July and several additional tests were 
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designed and performed to evaluate 
possible jammer localization approaches. 
Different experiments were conducted 
and, in particular, the following 
approaches were considered:
1. Spectrum monitoring and sentinel 
receivers:  a portable Rhode & 
Schwarz PR100 spectrum analyser 
was used to fi ngerprint the signal 
broadcast by jammers. A sentinel GPS 
receiver was also used to assess the 
impact of jamming on GPS devices.
2. Software Defi ned Radio (SDR)-
based detection: several detection 
approaches were implemented using 
the samples provided by a low-
cost TV tuner used as agile front-
end operating in the GNSS bands. 
3. Receiver-based detection: detection 
techniques based on the measurements 
provided by a GNSS receiver have 
been considered. This included 
the use of C/N0 measurements 
provided by victim GPS receivers.   
4. Jammer localization using C/N0 
measurements: two approaches for 
jammer localization were attempted 
using a single moving GPS receiver 
and a grid of static smartphones.  
These four types of tests were performed 
in parallel considering two scenarios: 
in the fi rst case, a static jammer was 
used while the detection unit was 
mounted on a moving vehicle. In the 
second scenario, the role of jammers 
and detection units was inverted: the 
jammer was installed on a moving vehicle 
while the detection unit was static on 
the road side. The two scenarios are 
complementary and provide insights 
on the effects caused by a jammer.
For jammer localization, a third 
scenario was also considered where 
a grid of Android phones was used to 
simultaneously collect C/N0  measurements. 
This last type of tests was implemented 
only during the second data collection. 
The two measurement campaigns 
took place in the proximity of the 
village of Črnotiče in Slovenia 
and provided valuable data for the 
evaluation of the jamming threat.
This paper provides an account of the 
experimental and analysis activities 
originated from the experiments 
conducted in Črnotiče. More details 
on specifi c aspects of the experiments 
conducted can be found in the references 
provided at the end of the paper.  
The Slovenian campaigns
The fi rst scenario considered during the 
two Slovenian campaigns is described 
in Figure 1. In this case, jammers were 
kept static whereas the detection unit 
was mounted on a car as schematically 
represented in Figure 1 b). The vehicle 
with the detection units moved, with 
an almost constant velocity, back and 
forth between the two way-points (A 
and B) shown in Figure 1 a). The tests 
were repeated considering different 
jammers (three jammers were used) and 
different speeds (50 and 90 km/h). The 
measurement units employed included 
a Realtek RTL2832U front-end, used 
to collect In-phase/Quadrature (I/Q) 
samples and implement experiments 
of type 2, a u-blox LEA-6T, GPS 
single frequency receiver, used to 
collect GNSS measurements and 
implements techniques of type 3 and 
4. The Ljubljana Interference Monitor 
(LIM), a composite detection unit 
based on a Raspberry Pi platform, 
a GPS receiver and a RTL2832U 
front-end was also adopted for 
testing real-time SDR approaches.
As mentioned above, a second 
scenario was also performed where 
the detection unit was static and the 
jammer was mounted on a vehicle. In 
this case, a portable Rhode & Schwarz 
PR100 spectrum analyser was used 
to fi ngerprint the jamming signal.
Fi gure 2: Smartphone-based test: a) test environment and location of the smartphones. 
b) schematic representation of the tests carried out considering a user walking through 
the smartphones with a jammer. The tests also considered the vehicular case.
F igure 1: Jammer test performed in a remote area close to Črnotiče. a) View of 
the road environment selected. b) Schematic representation of the tests carried 
out considering a static jammer and detection units mounted on a car.
The experimental results show that low-power car jammers 
can be effectively detected in a road environment using 
commercial devices such as portable spectrum analysers
Coordinates October 2016 | 13 
SD59_CMPL_October 2016.indd   13 08/10/16   9:01 PM
collected C/N0 measurements which 
were used for jammer localization.
Trapping the jammer
This section provides a summary 
of the results obtained for the 
different techniques tested and for 
the different scenarios considered.
Spectrum monitoring and 
sentinel receivers
The usage of portable spectrum analysers, 
such as the Rhode & Schwarz PR100 
device, allows one to obtain a clear 
fi ngerprint of the signal broadcast by a 
jammer. This approach not only allows 
one to detect the jammer presence but it 
also provides specifi c signatures which, in 
principle, can be used to identify the specifi c 
jammer type. During the experiments 
conducted, it was possible to clearly 
distinguish the three jammers adopted: 
each device has its Radio Frequency (RF) 
signature with a characteristic spectral shape.
The tests performed in the two scenarios 
provided similar results. The usage 
of a static jammer however allows 
one to establish a reference position 
for the jammer, and thus it allows 
the performance analysis of jammer 
localization techniques. For this reason, 
more emphasis is provided here to the 
results obtained for the fi rst scenario.
The third scenario developed for the 
techniques of type 4 is illustrated in 
Figure 2. In this case, sixteen Android 
smartphones were placed over a regular 
grid along a straight section of the road. 
The location of the phones is shown 
in Figure 2 along with a schematic 
representation of the tests performed. A 
vehicle equipped with a jammer passed 
several times between the phones at 
different speeds. Also in this case, the 
test was repeated considering three 
different jammers and different speeds. 
The experiment was also repeated 
considering a pedestrian user slowly 
moving through the phones. During the 
experiments, the phones continuously 
Figu re 4: Time-varying histogram (a) and PSD (b) of the signal collected in the 
presence of a jam mer. The same jammer considered in Figure 3 is analysed.
Fig ure 3: RF ﬁ ngerprint of a wideband jammer: a) RF spectrum measured in 
40 MHz bandwidth b) Spectrogram evaluated in a 10 MHz bandwidth.
Sample results obtained during the 
Slovenian campaign are shown in 
Figure 3 which provides the RF 
signature of one of the three jammers 
considered. The jamming signal spans 
a 32 MHz frequency interval which is 
signifi cantly larger than the bandwidth 
of GPS and Galileo open signals.
The data were collected with the 
equipment positioned on the road side 
with the jammer placed on a car passing 
closely to the observation station. The 
minimum distance between jammer and 
spectrum analyser was about 5 m. The 
colour variations in the spectrogram in 
Figure 3 b) refl ect the received power 
variations due to the approaching 
and distancing of the jammer.
SDR-based detection
The availability of the I/Q samples 
provided by a SDR front-end enables 
sophisticated detection techniques with 
performance similar to that achieved 
using a commercial spectrum analyser . 
In particular, I/Q samples can be used to 
compute metrics such as the histogram and 
the Power Spectral Density (PSD) of the 
input samples. The histogram and the PSD 
provide a signature of the jamming signal, 
and thus enable jammer identifi cation.  
The time-varying histogram and PSD 
obtained considering the same jammer 
discussed in the previous section are 
provided in Figure 4. When the jammer 
is in the close proximity of the RTL 
device, the jamming signal saturates the 
front-end and the input samples assume 
signifi cant values. This fact is refl ected 
by the multi-coloured bands present 
in Figure 4 a). A similar effect can be 
observed in PSD: when the jammer 
is closed to detection unit signifi cant 
power is present in all the frequencies 
captured by the SDR front-end.
From the histogram and the PSD, it is 
possible to derive summary statistics 
which can be used for jamming detection. 
Metrics derived from the histogram are 
the signal mean, variance and kurtosis 
whereas metrics derived from the PSD are 
the total power and the spectral entropy. 
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Receiver-based detection
GNSS receivers provide several 
measurements which are signifi cantly 
affected by a jamming signal. C/N0 
measurements, for example, refl ect the 
presence of interference: a signifi cant 
drop in all C/N0 values is experienced 
in the presence of jamming. C/N0 
values are “naturally” provided by most 
GNSS receivers and are, for example, 
directly accessible in smartphones. Thus, 
jamming detection can be implemented 
exploiting C/N0 measurements.
In addition to C/N0 values, several 
receivers provide the Automatic Gain 
Control (AGC) count, a noise fl oor 
estimator and dedicated interference 
indicators. All these measurements have 
been used for jamming detection.
Sample results obtained using receiver-
based metrics are provided in Figure 5: 
the average C/N0 refl ects the reduction 
in performance caused by the proximity 
of the jammer. The Sum-of-Squares 
(SoS) approach suggested by [5] has 
also been considered: the SoS detection 
metric clearly refl ects the jammer 
presence. Finally, Figure 5 shows the 
AGC count as a function of time: 
when the car with the jammer passes 
closely to victim receiver, the AGC 
count drops signifi cantly, revealing the 
presence of an interference source.
A summary of all the detection metrics 
considered in this work, with both SDR- 
and receiver-based techniques is shown 
in Figure 6. All these techniques have 
been analysed and compared using the 
data collected during the Slovenian 
campaigns. A detailed analysis of these 
detection approaches can be found in [4].
Note that more complex approaches can be 
developed by combining the information 
provided by both SDR platforms and GPS 
receivers. An example is the LIM platform 
developed by the University of Ljubljana 
which integrates different sensors using 
the Raspberry Pi micro-computer. More 
details on LIM can be found in [6].
Localization technique
Finally, jammer localization techniques 
have been implemented using 
C/N0 measurements. Two approaches, 
namely synthetic and crowdsourcing 
localization, have been considered. 
The two approaches are both based 
on the usage of C/N0 values: in the 
fi rst case, measurements are taken by 
the same device at different locations 
and at different time instants. In 
the second case, a grid of Android 
phones is used to simultaneously 
collect the C/N0 measurements. 
As indicated above, C/N0 estimates 
are affected by the presence of 
interference and the C/N0 provided by 
a receiver can be expressed as [7]:
 (1)
where Ci  is the power received for the ith 
satellite, N0 is noise power spectral density 
and J is the received jamming power. kα is 
the Spectral Separation Coeffi cient (SSC) 
[7] and models the fi ltering effect of the 
receiver on the jamming signal. From 
Eq. (1), it emerges the C/N0 is a function 
Figur e 5: Sample results obtained using the measurements provided a GPS receiver in the presence 
of jamming. Notches and peaks are observed in the correspondence of the jammer passages.
Figure 6: Detection metrics considered in this work
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For the crowdsourcing approach, it was 
not possible to use the same principle 
described for synthetic localization. 
In particular, each phone involved in 
the experiment was characterized by 
a different β. Since the calibration 
of all phones was not feasible, a 
different approach was adopted. C/N0 
measurements are fi rst used to detect the 
jamming presence: jammer localization 
is then achieved by combining detection 
results from different smartphones. 
For localization, it was assumed that 
GNSS receivers are suffi ciently far from 
the jamming source to obtain a valid 
position solution and suffi ciently close 
to be affected by the jamming signal and 
observe a reduction in C/N0. Jamming 
detection was implemented using the 
SoS approach mentioned above and the 
jammer position was fi nally obtained as
Sample results obtained using the 
approach described above are shown in 
Figure 7. A geometric interpretation of 
the cost function and of the estimated 
jammer position is provided in Figure 
7 a): the jammer is localized at the 
intersection of different circles. Each circle 
is centred at the location of the vehicle 
hosting the detection unit and its radius is 
defi ned by the average C/N0 observed. 
In Figure 7 b), the cost function is plotted 
with respect to the estimated jammer 
location expressed in a local frame 
centred in the true jammer position. 
Thus, the coordinates estimated for 
the jammer correspond to the actual 
localization error which, in this case, 
is less than 10 meters. This level of 
accuracy was consistently observed 
among the different tests performed.
F igure 7: Jammer localization using a moving detection unit. a) Geometric interpretation 
of the cost function and of the estimated jammer position. b) Cost function evaluated 
using C/N0 measurements collected at the points indicated by black crosses.
F igure 8: Average C/N0 as a function of the receiver position 
(distance from the ﬁ rst device) and time.
of the received jamming power which 
can be related to the jammer/receiver 
distance using a simple path-loss model:
 (2)
where J0,dBW is the jammer reference 
power measured at distance d0. α is the 
path loss exponent and can be assumed 
equal to 2 for rural open environments. 
d is the distance between the jammer 
and the victim GNSS receiver. Eq. (2) 
is expressed in logarithmic units. By 
expressing (1) in logarithmic scale 
and combining it with (2) it is possible 
to obtain a simple model valid when 
the jammer is in the proximity of 
the victim receiver. In particular,
 (3)
where βi is an unknown parameter 
which absorbs several factors such as 
the un-interfered C/N0, the SSC and the 
transmitted jamming power. βi can be 
obtained through calibration.
Synthetic localization is based on (4) 
where C/N0 measurements are combined 
in a cost function whose minimum 
corresponds to the location of the 
jammer. In particular, it is possible to 
consider C/N0 measurements taken at 
different time instants and in different 
positions as equivalent to simultaneous 
observations from different receivers. 
In order to obtain more robust 
measurements, the average C/N0 can 
be used and (4) can be rewritten as: 
  (4)
where notation ‘[n]’ is used to indicate 
quantities measured at the instant n. 
In particular, (x[n],y[n]) and d[n] are 
the receiver position and the receiver 
distance from the jammer at the instant 
n. β is the average of the βi terms which 
refer to a single satellite. Using (4), it is 
possible to construct the cost function:
  (5)
where N is the number of instants 
during which a jamming event is 
detected. The jammer position is 
computed minimizing (5). 
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 (6)
where D is the set of receivers detecting 
a jammer. #D is the number of receivers 
detecting the jammer and (xk, yk) is 
the position of the kth receiver. The 
jammer location is thus identifi ed as 
the centroid of the positions of the 
receivers which detect the jammer. If 
D is empty, the jammer is not detected 
and localization is not performed. 
Sample results obtained using the 
crowdsourcing approach are presented in 
Figure 8. Specifi cally, the average C/N0 
is provided as a function of the phone 
location and time. The average C/N0 
describes a “spatial wave” which clearly 
shows the passages of the jammer. 
Although few devices malfunctioned, 
the direction of motion and velocity of 
the jammer can be easily identifi ed. 
The estimated jammer positions together 
with the smartphones locations are 
shown in Figure 9. The red trajectory 
is the jammer trajectory obtained 
considering a single passage of the 
jammer. The positions of the jammer 
and of the smartphones are plotted in a 
local East North (EN) frame centred in 
the mean of the smartphone coordinates. 
From the fi gure, it emerges that the 
trajectory of the jammer was correctly 
identifi ed even if some of the devices 
were not properly working during the 
experiment. This demonstrates the 
robustness of the proposed approach in 
the presence of malfunctions of some 
detection units. Additional results on 
the jammer localization techniques 
described can be found in [8].
Conclusions
This paper provides a comprehensive 
account of the activities jointly conducted 
by the European Commission JRC, the 
University of Ljubljana and AKOS to 
characterize and ultimately mitigate 
the jamming threat. Two unique 
measurement campaigns have been 
conducted and several experiments have 
been conducted to evaluate different 
detection and localization approaches. 
The experimental results show that low-
power car jammers can be effectively 
detected in a road environment using 
commercial devices such as portable 
spectrum analysers. Effective and 
affordable detectors can be obtained 
using SDR platforms and measurements 
directly provided by commercial GPS 
receiver including smartphones. The 
results obtained are promising and 
encourage additional work towards the 
development of effective jammer traps.
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